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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOANNA MITCHELL, 
individually, and JOANNA 
MITCHELL, persona1 
representative of the estate 
of Jerry Mitchell, deceased, 
Appellants, 
v. 
Estate of JERRY L. RICE, and 
JOHN DOES 1 through V, 
Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The sole issue on appeal is whether as a matter of law Jerry 
Rice was an employee or an independent contractor for Jerry 
Mitchell as defined under Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-42(b)• 
This being an appeal from the trial court's granting of 
Appellee's motion for Summary Judgment, the applicable standards of 
review are as follows: 
A. The appellant is entitled to have all the facts, and all 
inferences arising therefrom, considered in the light most 
favorable to her. Briggs v. Halcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 
Court of Appeals No. 930296 
District Court No. 910902469 
Priority No. 15 
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1987); Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
B. An appellate court accords no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions in support of the grant of summary 
judgment, but reviews them for correctness. Bevnon v. St. George 
Dixie Lodge. 210 U.A.R. 63 (Utah 1993); Schurtz v. BMW of North 
America, Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-42 (1993) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-60 (1953) 
The full text of the above controlling statutory and constitu-
tional authority is fully set out in appendix to appellants brief 
in accordance with Rule 24(a)(6) and 24(f) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a wrongful death action brought against the Estate of 
Jerry Rice by the widow of the decedent Jerry Mitchell, JoAnna 
Mitchell as personal representative of his estate. Jerry Mitchell 
and Jerry Rice were killed in an accident while driving a truck for 
Logistics Express. The plaintiff has alleged that Jerry Mitchell's 
death was the result of the negligence of Jerry Rice in operating 
the motor vehicle. 
Course of Proceedings 
On March 16, 1993 the appellee moved for summary judgment 
claiming appellant's cause of action was barred by the exclusive 
remedy provision of Utah's Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code 
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Annotated Section 35-1-60. After briefing and oral arguments from 
both parties, Judge Glasmann granted appellee's motion for summary 
judgment on June 1, 1993. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judge Glasmann granted appellee's motion for summary judgment 
on June lf 1993. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 19, 1989, Jerry L. Rice and Jerry H. Mitchell 
died in a motor vehicle accident while driving a truck for 
Logistics Express. (R. 135). Mr. Mitchell's widow, JoAnna 
Mitchell, filed a complaint against the Estate of Jerry L. Rice 
alleging that her husband's death was a result of Mr. Rice's 
negligence in driving the truck. (R. 1). 
Mr. Mitchell drove for Logistics Express pursuant to an 
independent contractor lease agreement. (R. 136). This document 
attempts to define the relationship between Mr. Mitchell and 
Logistics Express. (R. 239) . Jerry Rice was not a party to the 
above-referenced lease agreement. (R. 239). The lease agreement 
explicitly provides in several clauses that Jerry Mitchell was an 
independent contractor of Logistics Express. (R. 239). In 
paragraph 2 of the Terms and Conditions of the Lease Agreement, the 
document refers to the "Owner, its employees, agents and servants." 
(R. 239). 
The lease agreement also provides that the "[o]wner warrants 
and agrees that it shall have full and direct control and supervi-
sion over the operation of the motor vehicle . . . " (R. 239). The 
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agreement further provides that the M[o]wner may determine the 
routes of travel, points of stop for rest and service to its 
equipment, and shall in every respect, direct and control its 
employees, including their hire, discharge, training, wages, hours 
and working conditions," (R. 239). 
With respect to the maintenance of workers compensation 
coverage as well as the payment of withholding taxes, the agreement 
provides as follows: 
Owner shall obtain and be solely responsible 
for Worker's Compensation insurance for Owner 
and Owner's employees, if any. In addition, 
Owner shall pay all withholding and employment 
taxes due to Federal, State or local govern-
ment on account of Owner and/or Owner's em-
ployees . . . (R. 239). 
Jerry Rice is not mentioned by name in the lease agreement 
executed among Mitchell and Logistics Express. (R.239). 
The specific method by which Worker's Compensation coverage 
was provided in this case was through Logistic's Express as stated 
in paragraph 5 of the lease agreement. 
In order to assist Owner in obtaining Worker's 
Compensation insurance coverage provided for 
herein with respect to any employee(s) em-
ployed by Owner . . . Logex has arranged for 
insurance in which Owner may voluntarily, at 
Owner's sole cost and expense, elect to par-
ticipate . . . " (R. 239). 
Jerry Mitchell elected to be insured under Logistics Express' 
program. Therefore, Logistics Express purchased Worker's Compensa-
tion insurance for Mitchell and Rice, and the Mitchells in turn 
paid for this coverage out of their reimbursement for each trip. 
(R. 139). 
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In addition to the lease agreement, other documents were 
presented in the proceedings below to aid the court in its 
determination. A document labeled "Exhibit C" on page 179 of the 
record was executed between Jerry Rice and Logistics Express. It 
characterizes Rice as an employee of Mitchell. Jerry Mitchell was 
not a party to this agreement. Kelly Jensen, an employee of 
Logistics Express stated that this document was not meant to define 
the relationship between Jerry Rice and Jerry Mitchell. (R. 165, 
185, 186). 
Another document submitted to the trial court is an agreement 
between Jerry Rice and Jerry and JoAnna Mitchell. (R. 180). This 
agreement provides that Jerry Rice was to work on a commission 
basis. It further states that Jerry Rice was responsible for 
paying his own income tax and social security tax. (R. 180). 
The defendant submitted a document to the trial court entitled 
"Owner Operator and Owner Operator Driver Questionnaire." (R. 
226) . This document, filled out by Jerry Rice, lists as prior work 
history, work performed for Jerry Mitchell. The previous times he 
worked for Mr. Mitchell, Rice noted that he stopped working because 
of a "reduction in force." (R. 226, 227). This document does not 
attempt to define the relationship between Mitchell and Rice. 
The record also reflects facts relating to the course of 
conduct between Mitchell and Rice. Jerry Rice would, on occasion, 
drive with Mr. Mitchell on the various trucking assignments Mr. 
Mitchell would receive from Logistics Express. (R. 163-65). 
However, Jerry Rice was under no obligation to drive with Mr. 
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Mitchell, In fact, Jerry Rice would often refuse to go on runs 
with Mr. Mitchell. (R. 164). When Jerry Rice would drive on runs 
with Mr. Mitchell, Jerry Rice would determine when, where and for 
how long to stop on rest breaks. (R. 164) . When paying Jerry 
Rice, Mr. Mitchell did not withhold income tax or social security 
tax. (R. 165). In addition, Logistics Express purchased Workers 
Compensation Insurance for Mitchell and Rice, which was paid 
through a deduction in the reimbursement the Mitchells would 
receive from Logistics Express. (R. 139). Finally, Jerry Rice 
would sometimes use Jerry Mitchell's truck to perform runs for 
Logistics Express by himself. (R. 200). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under the multifactor test set forth in Utah Code Annotated 
Section 35-1-42 and subsequent case law, Jerry Rice was an 
independent contractor of Jerry Mitchell and not his employee. 
Jerry Rice paid his own withholding tax. To the extent power and 
control could be exercised in a trucking assignment, both Mitchell 
and Rice had equal power and control. Rice worked when he wanted 
to, and not at Mitchell's command. There is no evidence to suggest 
that Mitchell exercised any power and control over the work beyond 
that which a proprietor would exercise over an independent 
contractor. 
Furthermore, case law relied upon by the appellee in moving 
for summary judgment is not relevant. The facts presented in the 
Kinne decision are markedly different than the facts presently 
before the court. Thus, the court's reliance on Kinne was mis-
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placed. The Kinne court was not presented with a fact situation 
which was entirely inconsistent with the existence of an employment 
relationship. Therefore, the Kinne decision is not controlling on 
the disposition of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RICE WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF MITCHELL, THEREFORE 
JOANNA MITCHELL'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY THE EXCLU-
SIVE REMEDY PROVISION. 
Judge Glasmann granted the Estate of Jerry Rice's summary 
judgment on three bases. First, Judge Glasmann believed the case 
of Kinne v. Industrial Commission, 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980), 
discussed below, was the closest on point. Second, the court based 
its decision on the written documents purporting to define the 
relationship between the parties. Finally, the court also noted 
that the conduct between the parties was suggestive of an employ-
ment relationship. It is Mitchell's position that Judge Glasmann 
erred in concluding that Jerry Rice was Jerry Mitchell's employee 
as a matter of law. The record clearly reflects both factual 
disputes, and in the alternative, facts which do not entitle the 
appellee to judgment as a matter of law. Essentially, under the 
multifactor tests set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-42 
and case law defining these factors, the facts of this case do not 
lend themselves to only one reasonable conclusion. As such, 
summary judgment was inappropriate in this case. 
The Utah Supreme Court has set forth the proper test for 
determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent 
contractor under Utah's Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code 
7 
Annotated Section 35-1-43(1)(b). 
Speaking in generality, an employee is one who 
is hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at a 
fixed rate, to perform the employer's work as 
directed by the employer and who is subject to 
a comparatively high degree of control in 
performing those duties. In contrast, an 
independent contractor is one who is engaged 
to do some particular project or piece of 
work, usually for a set total sum, who may do 
the job in his [or her] own way, subject to 
only minimal restriction or controls and is 
responsible only for its satisfactory comple-
tion. Harry L. Young & Sons v. Ashton, 538 
P.2d 316 (Utah 1975). 
The court went on to list the appropriate facts to be 
considered under this analysis. First, "whatever covenants or 
agreements exist concerning the right of direction and control over 
the employee, whether express or implied;" second, "the right to 
hire and fire;" third, "the method of payment, i.e. whether in 
wages or fees, as compared to payment for a complete job or 
project;" and finally, fourth, "the furnishing of the equipment." 
Id. at 318. 
Several Utah cases have addressed independent lease agreements 
and their effect on the status of individuals under Utah's Workers 
Compensation system. While facing similar lease agreements, the 
courts in those cases faced markedly different facts regarding the 
parties' actual course of conduct. For instance, in Kinne v. 
Industrial Commission, 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980), the court was 
presented with a lease agreement between an owner operator and a 
trucking company. This lease agreement provided that the owner-
operator was to be responsible for the direction and control of his 
employees. The owner-operator hired an individual to drive his 
truck and that individual was later injured. In Kinne, the owner-
operator was attempting to evade payment of Workers Compensation 
benefits to the driver. The court found that the driver was an 
employee of the owner-operator. The court reasoned as follows: 
The agreement gave Kinne the legal right of 
direction and control over Wynn, even though 
such right may not have been exercised. It is 
the right of control that is the critical 
element underlying an employment relationship 
in the present case. Id. at 928. 
In this context, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the findings 
of the Industrial Commission. "These factors support the Com-
mission's finding that Kinne was Wynn's employer." Id. The Kinne 
court was not presented with a course of conduct between the owner-
operator and the driver which was inconsistent with and contrary to 
the terms of the lease agreement between the owner-operator and the 
trucking company. Neither was the Kinne court presented with a 
document between the actual parties to the case (the owner-operator 
and the driver) setting forth terms of the relationship inconsis-
tent with the maintenance of an employer-employee relationship. 
Thus the Kinne decision was rendered in a factual context radically 
different than the one before the court today. 
Appellees in the proceeding below attempted to focus on the 
potential right to control of Mr. Mitchell. Although language in 
the Kinne decision states the unexercised right to control was a 
crucial factor in its determination, again, the facts of this case 
present a different fact pattern. What is present in the instant 
case is not unexercised power, but rather, a course of conduct 
totally inconsistent with the exercise of the type of power found 
9 
crucial in Kinne. 
The facts indicate that what right to power and control that 
existed was equally exercised by Mitchell and Rice. The right to 
determine the destination and the route to the destination did not 
exist. This was already predetermined by the very nature of the 
trucking assignment. A trucking assignment to deliver goods from 
Salt Lake City to Denver does not leave much in the way of 
discretion as to how and where to go. When there was room for 
discretion, both parties exercised equal power and control. The 
facts were undisputed that when Rice was driving he could determine 
where, when and for how long to break. Furthermore, as to the 
discretion as to whether to take an assignment, the facts also show 
that Rice would drive with Mitchell whenever he felt like it, and 
would often refuse to go on runs with Mr. Mitchell even though Mr. 
Mitchell needed him for the trip. This course of conduct is simply 
inconsistent with an employer relationship. As such, the Kinne 
decision is not controlling and Judge Glasmann's reliance on the 
Kinne case in this instance was error. 
Also notably absent from the Kinne decision are documents 
executed between the actual parties manifesting an inconsistent 
intent. (R. 180) . In a document executed between Jerry Rice and 
the Mitchells, Jerry Rice agrees to work on a commission basis, to 
take care of his own income and social security tax. Finally, a 
document attempting to label Rice as an employee of Mitchell, was 
not, according to an agent of Logistics Express, meant to define 
the relationship between Mitchell and Rice, but rather to make sure 
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that Rice was not to be considered an employee of Logistics 
Express. The only document executed between the parties before the 
court here is inconsistent with an employer-employee relationship. 
The existence of these two sets of facts did not entitle the 
estate of Jerry Rice to judgment as a matter of law. The record 
clearly reflects a course of conduct entirely inconsistent with the 
maintenance of an employment relationship between Mitchell and 
Rice. Appellant has cited to the record facts establishing that 
Rice was able to determine when, where and for how long to take 
rest breaks. Rice also had discretion as to whether to go on a 
particular job with Mitchell. This type of independence was 
recognized as an indication of an independent contractor relation-
ship in Graham v. R. Thorne Foundation, 675 P.2d 1198 (Utah 1984). 
In that case, the plaintiff "worked on any house he chose whether 
being constructed by Thorne or someone else who had employed [the 
worker] on unrelated jobs." Id. at 1197. Similarly with Rice, the 
facts indicate that Rice would work whenever he felt like it, and 
would take what jobs he wanted to take, not what jobs Mitchell 
wanted him to take. 
The other set of facts refers to the documents executed among 
the parties: Jerry Rice, Jerry Mitchell and Logistics Express. 
First, the lease agreement by its own terms gives Mitchell power 
and control over those that drive with him. However, the factual 
record demonstrates a course of conduct inconsistent with the lease 
agreement. In fact, the lease agreement also states that Mitchell 
was supposed to pay Rice's withholding tax. Mitchell did not do 
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this. This is yet another aspect of the conduct of the parties 
inconsistent with the lease agreement. Further vitiating the 
effect of the lease agreement is the fact that Rice was not even a 
party to an agreement which allegedly defines the relationship 
between Mitchell and Rice. Instead, the document was drafted by 
Logistics Express and is clearly drafted so that Logistics Express 
can escape any liability to Rice. Jerry Rice is not specifically 
mentioned in the lease agreement. This shows that the provisions 
in the lease agreement are general provisions. In no way can they 
be said to define the relationship between Mitchell and Rice. In 
sum, the lease agreement in this case is not a proper basis for 
granting summary judgment to the appellees. 
The other document characterizing Rice as an employee of 
Mitchell was entered into between Rice and Logistics Express. 
Mitchell was not a party to this agreement. An agent of Logistics 
Express stated that this document was not meant to define the 
relationship between Mitchell and Rice. 
Finally, the one document to which Mitchell and Rice were both 
parties sets forth terms inconsistent with an employment relation-
ship. This document states that Rice was to pay his own withhold-
ing taxes. This is another factor recognized in Utah law as 
favoring the conclusion that Rice was an independent contractor. 
In Graham v. R. Thorne Foundation. 675 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1984), the 
court found persuasive the fact that the worker "made no deductions 
for social security or withholding taxes as required generally by 
employers." Xd. at 1197. The court also noted that "others that 
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employed him also did not deduct social security or withholding 
taxes." Id. This was also the case with Rice. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hether the factual 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence meet the legal definition 
of "employee" under the Worker's Compensation Act is a question for 
the jury." Gourdin By and Through Close v. Scera, 845 P.2d 242 
(Utah 1992). In noting that a directed verdict was inappropriate, 
even though the facts may be undisputed, the court stated that "no 
single factor is completely controlling. Moreover, employee status 
is not by its dictionary definition, but rather by whether the 
facts and circumstances bring the worker within the requirements of 
the Workers Compensation Act." Id. 
The determination of whether Rice was Mitchell's employee was 
not properly determined in the context of a summary judgment. The 
existence of facts pointing in both directions is further sugges-
tive that summary judgment was inappropriate in this instance. 
CONCLUSION 
"Summary judgment can be granted when no genuine issue of 
material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Any doubts or uncertainties concerning issues 
of fact must be construed in favor of the party opposing summary 
judgment." Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Betta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). Construing the facts in the light most favorable 
to the appellant, summary judgment in this case was improper. 
There are factual disputes in this instance concerning the course 
of conduct between the parties. There is also a dispute about the 
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proper inferences to be drawn from the facts which are not 
disputed. Under Gourdin By and Through Close v. Scera, 845 P.2d 
242 (Utah 1992) this is sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 
The determination as to whether an individual is an employee or an 
independent contractor is a fact sensitive inquiry. A full trial 
should have been held so that the trier of fact could properly make 
a determination as to whether Rice was an independent contractor. 
The facts in this case for the most part point to a finding that 
Rice was an independent contractor. Some factors point to the 
opposite conclusion. Given this factual conflict, Judge Glasmann 
should not have ruled on the matter absent a full evidentiary 
hearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
^/0L^i^ 
PATRICK F. HtfLDEN 
JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
335 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION U W - J I - « T . 
tomary trade relationship between general con-
tractors and subcontractors. 
(c) A portion of a construction project subcon-
tracted to others may be considered to be a part 
or process in the trade or business of the general 
building contractor, only if the general building 
contractor, without regard to whether or not it 
would need additional employees, would perform 
the work in the normal course of its trade or busi-
ness. 
(d) Any person who is engaged in constructing, 
improving, repairing, or remodelling a residence 
tha t he owns or is in the process of acquiring as 
his personal residence may not be considered an 
employee or employer solely by operation of Sub-
section (a). 
(e) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a 
sole proprietorship may not be considered an em-
ployee under Subsection (a) if: 
(i) the person is not included as an em-
ployee under Subsection 35-l-43<3)(a); or 
(ii) the person is included as an employee 
under Subsection 35-1-43(3)(a), but his em-
ployer fails to insure or otherwise provide 
adequate payment of direct compensation, 
which failure is attributable to an act or 
omission over which the person had or 
shared control or responsibility. 
(f) For purposes of Subsection (eHn): 
(i) a partner of a partnership and an 
owner of a sole proprietorship are presumed 
to have had or shared control or responsibil-
ity for any failure to insure or otherwise pro-
vide adequate payment of direct compensa-
tion, the burden of proof being on any person 
seeking to establish the contrary; and 
(ii) evidence affirmatively establishing 
tha t a partner of a partnership or an owner 
of a sole proprietorship had or shared control 
or responsibility for any failure to insure or 
otherwise provide adequate payment of di-
rect compensation may only be overcome by 
clear and convincing evidence to the con-
trary. 
(g) A director or officer of a corporation may 
not be considered an employee under Subsection 
(a) if the director or officer is excluded from cov-
erage under Subsection 35-1-43(3Kb). 1993 
35-1-43. " E m p l o y e e , " "worker" or " w o r k m e n , " 
and "operative" defined — Mining les-
sees and sub lessees — P a r t n e r s and 
sole proprietors — Corpora te officers 
and d i r e c t o r s — Real es ta te agen t s a n d 
b r o k e r s . 
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" 
or "workmen," and "operative" mean-
(a) each elective and appointive officer and 
any other person, in the service of the state, or of 
any county, city, town, or school district within 
the state, serving the state, or any county, city, 
town, or school district under any election or ap-
pointment, or under any contract of hire, express 
or implied, written or oral, including each officer 
and employee of the state institutions of learning 
and members of the National Guard while on 
state active duty; and 
(b) each person in the service of any employer, 
' as defined in Section 35-1-42, who employs one or 
more workers or operatives regularly in the same 
business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, 
oral or written, including aliens and minors, 
whether legally or illegally working for hire, but 
not including any person whose employment is 
casual and not in the usual course of the trade, 
business, or occupation of his employer. 
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an em-
ployer under this chapter, any lessee in mines or of 
mining property and each employee and sublessee of 
the lessee shall be covered for compensation by the 
lessor under this chapter, and shall be subject to this 
chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same extent 
as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such 
wages as are paid employees for substantially similar 
work. The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores 
mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insur-
ance premium for that type of work. 
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may 
elect to include as an employee under this chap-
ter any partner of the partnership or the owner of 
the sole proprietorship. If a partnership or sole 
proprietorship makes this election, it shall serve 
written notice upon its insurance carrier and 
upon the commission naming the persons to be 
covered. No partner of a partnership or owner of 
a sole proprietorship is considered an employee 
under this chapter until this notice has been 
given. For premium rate making, the insurance 
carrier shall assume the salary or wage of the 
employee to be 150% of- the state's average 
weekly wage. 
(b) A corporation may elect not to include any 
director or officer of the corporation as an em-
ployee under this chapter. If a corporation makes 
this election, it shall serve written notice upon 
its insurance carrier and upon the commission 
naming the persons to be excluded from cover-
age. A director or officer of a corporation is con-
sidered an employee under this chapter until this 
notice has been given. 
(4) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" 
or "workman," and "operative" do not include a real 
estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in Sec-
tion 61-2-2, who performs services in that capacity for 
a real estate broker if: 
(a) substantially all of the real estate agent's 
or associated broker's income for services is from 
real estate commissions; 
(b) the services of the real estate agent or asso-
ciated broker are performed under a written con-
tract specifying tha t the real estate agent is an 
independent contractor; and 
(c) the contract states tha t the real estate 
agent or associated broker is not to be treated as 
an employee for federal income tax purposes. 
(5) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" 
or "workman," and "operative" do not include an of-
fender performing labor under Section 64-13-16 or 
64-13-19, except as required by federal statute or reg-
ulation. 1993 
35-1-44. Definition of terms. 
The following terms as used in this title shall be 
construed as follows: 
(1) "Average weekly earnings" means the av-
erage weekly earnings arrived at by the rules 
provided in Section 35-1-75. 
(2) "Award" means the finding or decision of 
the commission as to the amount of compensation 
due any injured, or the dependents of any de-
ceased, employee. 
(3) "Compensation" means the payments and 
benefits provided for in this title. 
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tnbutory negligence Proof of the mjuiy shall consti 
tute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of 
the employer and the burden shall be upon the em 
ployer to show freedom from negligence resulting in 
such injury And such employers shall also be subject 
to the provisions of the two sections next succeeding 
[Sections 35-1-58, 35-1-591 In any civil action permit-
ted under this section against the employer the em 
ployee shall be entitled to necessary costs and a rea-
sonable attorney fee assessed against the employer 
1%9 
15" 1-58 Righ t s of employees w h e r e employer 
fails to comply 
Any employee, whose employer has failed to torn 
ply with the provisions of Section 35 1-46, who has 
been injured by accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment, wheresoever such injury 
occurred, if the same was not purposely self-inflicted, 
or his dependents in case death has ensued may in 
lieu of proceeding against his employer by civil action 
in the courts as provided in the last preceding section 
[Section 35-1-57], file his application with the com 
mission for compensation in accordance with the 
terms of this title, and the commission shall hear and 
determine such application for compensation as in 
other cases, and the amount of compensation which 
the commission may ascertain and determine to be 
due to such injured employee, or his dependents in 
case death has ensued, shall be paid by such employer 
to the persons entitled thereto within ten days after 
receiving notice of the amount thereof as so fixed and 
determined by the commission m i 
35-1-59, Docke t ing a w a r d s in distr ict court 
Enfo rc ing j u d g m e n t . 
An abstract of any award may be filed in the office 
of the clerk of the district court of any county in the 
state, and must be docketed in the judgment docket of 
the district court thereof The time of the receipt of 
the abstract must be noted by him thereon and en 
tered in the docket When so filed and docketed the 
award shall constitute a hen from the time of such 
docketing upon the real property of the employer sit 
uated in the county, for a period of eight years from 
the date of the award unless previously satisfied Ex 
ecution may be issued thereon within the same time 
and in the same manner and with the same effect a^ 
if said award were a judgment of the district court 
In cases where the employer was uninsured at the 
time of the injury, the county attorney for the county 
in which the applicant or the employer resides, de 
pending on the district in which the final award i^  
docketed, shall enforce the judgment when requested 
by the industrial commission Where the action to 
enforce a judgment is initiated by other counsel, rea 
sonable attorney's fees and court costs shall be al 
lowed in addition to the award i ( f <i 
35-1-60. Exc lus ive r e m e d y agains t employer , oi 
officer, a g e n t o r employee — ()< cupa 
t iona l d i s ea se excep ted . 
I lie l ight to recover compensation pursuant to th< 
provisions of this title for injuries sustained bv an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not shall bt 
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall 
be the exclusive remedy against any officer agent or 
employee of the employer and the liabilities of the 
employer imposed by this act shall be in place of an\ 
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common 
law or otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse 
widow, children, parents, dependents, next of km 
heirs personal representatives, guardian or am 
other person whomsoevei, on account of any accident 
oi injury or death, in any way contracted sustained, 
aggravated or incurred by such employee in the 
ionise of or because of or arising out of his employ-
ment and no action at law may be maintained 
against an employer or against any officer, agent or 
employee of the employer based upon any accident, 
injury or death of an employee Nothing in this sec-
tion, however, shall prevent an employee (or his de-
pendents) from filing a claim with the industrial com-
mission of Utah for compensation in those cases 
within the provisions of the Utah Occupational Dis-
ease Disability Act, as amended 1953 
35-1-61 Repea led m i 
35-1-62 Injuries o r d e a t h c a u s e d by wrongful 
icts of p e r s o n s o t h e r t h a n employer , 
officer, agen t , o r e m p l o y e e of said em-
ployer — Righ t s of e m p l o y e r o r insur -
ance c a r r i e r in c a u s e of ac t ion — Main-
t e n a n c e of ac t ion — Not ice of in ten t ion 
to p r o c e e d a g a i n s t t h i r d p a r t y — Righ t 
to m a i n t a i n ac t ion n o t involving em-
ployee-employer r e l a t i onsh ip — Dis-
b u r s e m e n t of p r o c e e d s of r ecovery . 
When any injury or death for which compensation 
is payable under this title shall have been caused by 
the wrongful act or neglect of a person other than an 
employer, officer, agent, or employee of said em-
ployer, the injured employee, or in case of death his 
dependents, may claim compensation and the injured 
employee or his heirs or personal representative may 
also have an action for damages against such third 
person If compensation is claimed and the employer 
or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay com-
pensation, the employer or insurance carrier shall be-
come trustee cf the cause of action against the third 
party and may bring and maintain the action either 
in its own name or in the name of the injured em-
ployee, or his heirs or the personal representative of 
the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may 
not settle and release the cause of action without the 
consent of the commission Before proceeding against 
tht third party, the injured employee, or, in case of 
death his heirs, shall give written notice of such in-
tent ion to the carrier or other person obligated for the 
compensation payments, in order to give such person 
a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in 
the proceeding 
For the purposes of this section and notwithstand-
ing the provisions of Section 35-1-42, the injured em-
ployee or his heirs or personal representative may 
also maintain an action for damages against subcon-
tractors, general contractors, independent contrac-
t o r property owners or their lessees or assigns, not 
M npving an employee-employer relationship with 
I In injured or deceased employee at the time of his 
injury or death 
If any recovery is obtained against suth third per-
son it shall be disbursed as follows 
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, in-
cluding attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged 
proportionately against the parties as their inter-
ests may appear Any such fee chargeable to the 
employer or carrier is to be a credit upon any fee 
payable by the injured employee or, in the case of 
death, by the dependents, for any recovery had 
against the third party 
(2) The person liable for compensation pay-
ments shall be reimbursed in full for all pay-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOANNA MITCHELL, 
individually, and JoANNA 
MITCHELL, personal 
representative of the estate 
of Jerry Mitchell, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Estate of JERRY L. RICE, and 















Civil No. 910902469 
Judge Glasmann 
WHV 
Based upon the order of the court granting the 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment issued concurrently 
herewith, and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that 
defendant the Estate of Jerry L. Rice, is hereby awarded judgment 
in its favor against plaintiff JoAnna Mitchell, individually, and 
as personal representative of the estate of Jerry Mitchell, 
deceased, and that plaintiff's Amended Complaint and the 
Complaint filed in the consolidated action, are hereby dismissed 
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with prejudice and on the merits with rnrti party to bear their 
own costs. A \JJSH 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on 
this c£W day of W\aju , 1993, to the following counsel 
of record: & 
James R. Hasenyager 
MARQUARDT HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2661 Washington Blvd #202 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Gainer M. Waldbillig 
CHRISTENSEN JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys for Defendants Logistics Express 
175 South West Temple #510 
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Salt Lake City, Utah o*±±± 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
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N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND 3 UDICIAI i DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY , STATE OF UTAH 
J oANNA MITCHEI I ,, 
individually, and JoANNA 
MITCHELL, personal 
representative of the estate 
of Jerry Mitchell, deceased, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that for the reasons stated in the 
written memorandum and exhibits submitted therewith, that 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that judgment on the 
merits be entered for defendant the Estate of Jerry L. Rice, 
dismissing the plaintiff's Amended Complaint and her Complaint 
filed in the consolidated action, with prejudice, with each party 
to bear its own costs. 
DATED this /^^day of X^y^U^ , 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
Cr<Z^ ufftL^^i 
The Honorable Michael A. 
Glasmann 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MA^QUARDT HASE^YAGEfc & CUSTEN 
J«ames R. Hasenyager // / 
Attorneys for Plaintjxf /
 / 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER^ 
& NELSON 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
Attorneys for Defendant Estate of Jerry L. Rice 
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